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**Article:**  
Di Gregorio, M (2014) Gaining access to the State: political opportunities and agency in forest activism in Indonesia. Social Movement Studies: journal of social, cultural and political protest, 13 (3). 381 - 398. ISSN 1474-2837  
https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2013.856297

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Gaining Access to the State: Political Opportunities and Agency in Forest Activism in Indonesia

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Word count: 8,063 (text inclusive of tables/references/figure captions/footnotes/endnotes)

Acknowledgments

I thank Tim Forsyth, Christopher Rootes and Nick Crossley and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Support for this research was provided by the London School of Economics, the Central Research Fund of the University of London, the CAPRi Fellowship Program (IFPRI) and the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR).
Abstract

This paper investigates the complex nature of access to the state for environmental movement organizations (EMOs) and adopts an interactionist approach to explore inter-organizational networking between EMOs and state actors. The paper supports existing evidence that proximate political opportunities are in part contingent on the interests, claims and frames of policy actors. The main theoretical contribution of this paper is to illustrate that EMOs strategically adapt to existing opportunity environments and actively seek to engage state actors that are most receptive to their demands, as opposed to those that have most influence in the domain, and that new modes of governance facilitate such access. Using evidence from forest activism in Indonesia, it shows that: lobbying less powerful but more receptive actors is a strategy that EMOs use to overcome limited political opportunities and that semi-independent multi-actor forums expand access of EMOs to potential state actor allies. The paper also shows that within the Indonesian context these multi-stakeholders forums are actively supported by international organisations, which therefore directly contribute to expanding opportunities for EMOs.

Keywords: environmental movement, political opportunity, social network analysis, new modes of governance, forest tenure, Indonesia
This paper investigates the extent to which environmental movement organizations (EMOs) working in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia experience differential access to the state and how they try to expand their access through direct interaction with state actors.

Social movement scholars have studied the impact of political conditions external to the movement primarily through the political process approach. This approach suggests the broad political opportunities – first defined as ‘the openings, weak spots, barriers and resources of the political system itself’ (Eisinger, 1973, p.12), such as the degree of openness of the polity – influence social movement outcomes. Among the merits of these studies is the recognition that the political context and the rules of the games of a specific polity affect the choices and the chances of success of social movements (Morris, 2004).

But this approach cannot capture the complexities of EMOs’ access to state actors within one country (Saunders, 2009). Puzzles, such as why different EMOs experience differential access to state actors, remain largely unexplained (Rootes, 1999a). To answer this question we need to focus on meso-level processes – interactions among organizations or social groups – which help to reveal differential impacts of the political context on EMOs. Such an analysis, investigates issue-specific, constituency specific and contingent aspects of the political environment (David S. Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Rootes, 1999b; Saunders, 2009), including ‘proximate’ political opportunities or the ‘signals’ EMOs receive from their ‘immediate policy environment’. These in part depend on the interests, strategies, and frames of EMOs (Peluso, 1992; Tarrow, 1996, p.42; 58-59).

In addition, activists can at times impact proximate political opportunities (Rootes, 1999b; Saunders, 2009; Tarrow, 1996). EMOs do not just respond to
political opportunities; they try to, and sometimes succeed in, changing political opportunities. For example, EMOs lobby elites to try to recruit allies in the hope of creating new openings to access state institutions.

In order to investigate the contingent nature of the political context, this paper adopts an interactionist approach to political opportunities (Emirbayer, 1997; D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996), which challenges the assumption that environmental movements and the state are unitary actors (Saunders, 2009). It operationalizes this approach through the investigation of inter-organizational (meso-level) networking between EMOs and state actors. Two types of sustained direct interactions between EMOs and state actors, which Petrova and Tarrow (2007, p.79) label ‘transactional activism’, are investigated: lobbying on the part of EMOs, and participation in hybrid and semi-independent forums based on partnership principles (or new modes of governance). EMOs in Indonesia engage in both protest activities typical of social movements and more conventional politics, such as direct lobbying, or non-contentious forms of ‘advocacy aimed at influencing public policy’ (Enjolras & Sivesing, 2009, p.153)

The paper contributes to theoretical knowledge as well as empirical evidence on environmental movements in three ways. First, it provides evidence about the contingent nature of proximate political opportunities and shows that EMOs strategically adapt to their environment. Second, it shows that new modes of governance expand political opportunities for EMOs. And third, it shows that international actors affect political opportunities in environmental domains in the global South.

Activism on forest tenure in Indonesia provides an interesting case for analysis. Indonesia became a multi-party democracy only in 1999 after three decades of
authoritarian rule under Suharto. The environmental movement became a national actor in the 1980s, was largely tolerated by Suharto and since 1999 has expanded and stepped up its political demands (Di Gregorio, 2011; Peluso, Afiff, & Fauzi Rachman, 2008). Today the movement is formed by varied organizations from public interest lobbies, to professional protest organizations, participatory pressure groups and participatory protest organizations. A forest-rich nation with a long pattern of dispossession of forest dependent communities for the sake of ‘development’ (Peluso, 1992; Potter, 2009), Indonesia has attracted international EMOs and donors to support forest conservation and features a domestic environmental justice movement fighting for recognition of local forest rights (Nomura, 2009; Peluso, et al., 2008). EMOs working on forest tenure focus on diverse issues (from conservation to local livelihoods), represent a variety of constituencies (from Western conservationists wanting to save orangutans, to local farmers growing rice and collecting forest products) and use protest action as much as lobbying to demand policy change (Di Gregorio, 2011). This diversity of actors, demands and strategies provides the ideal setting to study whether EMOs face differential access to the state, and how they respond to and try to affect their political environment.

This article begins by illustrating why EMOs face distinct opportunities to access the state and then presents an interactionist approach to help investigate contingent features of political opportunities faced by EMOs within one country. This is followed by the methods section and the analysis of transactional activism in Indonesia, focusing on lobbying and participation in new modes of governance. From the evidence, I derive four propositions on the contingent nature of proximate political opportunities.
Political Opportunities for Whom?

The political process theory suggests that political opportunities, mobilising structures and cultural framing determine the emergence and success of social movements (D. S. Meyer, 2004). Mobilising structures refer to the organizational forms and informal networks that facilitate mobilization, while cultural framing indicates the shared meaning that ‘mediates between opportunity, organization and action’ (McAdam, 1996, p.5). Political conditions external to the movement are labelled ‘political opportunities’ and are defined as ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements’ (Tarrow, 1996, p.54).

Political opportunities have been operationalized in many different ways (David S. Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). Typically, broad political opportunities, such as the degree of openness of the political system (e.g. democratic regimes usually being more open to social movements than authoritarian ones), its dominant strategy toward challengers (repression versus accommodation), and the presence of elite allies, are used to explain differences in movement strategies and outcomes across countries and over time (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1992; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). Often these have been interpreted as structural features of society, or the rules and external resources (Giddens, 1984) that affect social movements in a uniform way.

Yet, Tarrow (1996, p.42) distinguishes broad ‘statist’ opportunity structures from opportunities that are ‘proximate to particular actors’ or to particular policy areas. He argues for the need to go beyond the idea of political opportunities as exclusively long-term state continuities and explore their proximate and ‘conjunctural’ features. He adds that social movements not only ‘seize opportunities, they make them’ as well.
Thus, within the broader political and social structure, collective action can contribute to expand opportunities for the movement, for a specific group, for its opponents or for the elites (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; Tarrow, 1996, p.58). In line with this understanding, this paper analyses: 1) how proximate political opportunities actually differ for particular EMOs, and 2) how EMOs try not just to respond, but create new or reshape (change) existing political opportunities to their advantage (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; Saunders, 2009).

On the first point, it is well-known that moderate EMOs enjoy more extensive access to the state than radical ones (Rootes, 1999a). In Indonesia, some state actors facilitate conservation groups while restricting access to environmental justice groups. These differences are due to the characteristics and behaviour of both EMOs and state agencies. Different EMOs often have diverse identities, strategies, put forth distinct claims and frame problems in different ways (Saunders, 2008). Similarly, while one state actor may perceive a challenge from EMOs as a threat, another may see an opportunity for alliance (Rucht, 1988). For example, in Indonesia the Ministry of Environment supported the protest activities of environmentalists against mining in protected forest areas, while the Ministry of Forestry strongly resisted them. The Ministry of Environment sought out allies among EMOs to try to strengthen its own position vis-à-vis the more powerful Ministry of Forestry (Peluso, et al., 2008).

Existing power relations among state actors influence alliances and conflict systems (Kriese, 2004), but how they do this depends on the dispute at hand (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). In short, at the meso-level, proximate political opportunities are contingent on the issue of contention, and on the different interests, frames, and strategies of actors (Rucht, 1988; Saunders, 2009).
To explain these differences, it is necessary to investigate meso-level processes, moving from the polity as a unit of analysis to the level of social actors that operate within it. In doing so, I also underline that environmental movements are loose aggregations of distinct actors with different interests. Theory, in fact, defines social movements as decentralized networks of actors (Diani, 1992; Saunders, 2009). In the same way, the state is formed by multiple actors with diverse interests (Laumann & Knoke, 1987; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992).

**Managing Political Opportunities**

The contingency of proximate political opportunities does not only imply that different EMOs face different opportunities. It also suggests that within the constraints of broader more stable political opportunities, EMOs can alter their opportunities to access the state (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; Tarrow, 1993, 1996). They use collective action to try to influence policies, change political alignments, and increase the salience of issues, which can all lead to changes in access to elites (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). At the same time the actions of state actors such as policy decisions or political realignments open or close opportunities for specific EMOs (D. S. Meyer, 1993).

International actors also affect political opportunities for environmental movements, in particular in the global South and in countries in transition, by providing resources or putting pressure on national governments through the so-called ‘boomerang’ effect (Carmin & Hicks, 2002; Cisař, 2010; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Two interactionist features are investigated here to illustrate how EMOs respond and try to change their access to elites: lobbying and participation in new modes of governance. There is no intention to suggest that these are the only ways in which
these policy actors manage political opportunities. They are, however, visibly important features in the context of forest tenure activism in Indonesia.

Transactional Activism and Lobbying

Transactional activism is one way in which EMOs try to reveal and alter political opportunities. The term refers to relational forms of collective action in inter-organizational networks, or ‘the ties—enduring and temporary—among organized non-state actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions’ (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007, p. 79).

There are many forms of direct engagement with elites. One of these is lobbying, or ‘the process of seeking to influence government and its institutions by informing the public policy agenda’ (Zetter, 2008, p.3). In this paper I refer to lobbying in terms of efforts by single EMOs to influence single state actors. Lobbying is not just used to influence precise policies, but also to reveal and recruit new allies within state institutions (Concini, 2002). In addition, as successful lobbying translates into policy changes, these might affect future political opportunities to varying degrees (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). But how are allies recruited through lobbying? Ideological positions permitting, it is reasonable to assume that EMOs would use the most direct means to lobby policymakers (D. S. Meyer, 1993). This implies targeting the most influential state actors in the relevant policy domain. But EMOs also take into account past and current signals of openness to movement claims and lobbying activities. After all, it would be wasteful to concentrate all resources where opportunities are most restricted or where past actions have not produced any result (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Therefore, in the case of limited political opportunities to influence key elites,
it might be more fruitful to divert lobbying toward less influential, but more receptive actors.

Whether lobbying activities of EMOs can expand political opportunities, depends also on the content of lobbying. It has been suggested that the environmental movement is predominantly instrumental in nature, and therefore focuses on influencing concrete policies and political decisions. In other words, lobbying by EMOs tends to focus on ‘what is to be decided’ (Rucht, 1988, p. 321). However, at times EMOs may challenge constitutional-choice rules (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994) raising questions such as: Who is to decide what, and according to which rules? In the latter case, lobbying can directly expand political opportunities, and result in increased access of EMOs or of their beneficiaries to decision-making processes. Thus, lobbying does not only aim to affect policies in a narrow sense, but provides an avenue to expand existing political opportunities.

Transactional Activism and New Modes of Governance

Participation in new institutional venues also provides EMOs with opportunities to gain access to the state. These represent additional formal or informal channels through which to exert influence and seek new elite allies (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). In this respect, new modes of governance – diverse hybrid and semi-independent forums based on partnership principles (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011) – are of particular relevance. These multi-actor governance processes can have diverse functions, from expanding the inclusiveness of the policy dialogue and decision-making to informing policy implementation to self-regulating activities of non-state actors. They are usually not based on law and hierarchy. Examples from Indonesia are the formation of independent agencies and commissions (e.g. the
National Forestry Board), independent working groups (e.g. the Indonesian Working Group on Forest Finance), EMO-led forums (e.g. the Indonesian Communication Forum on Community Forestry), and self-regulation bodies from the private sector, such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (see appendix for complete list).

In the last decades, new modes of governance have become part of environmental politics in the global South. In particular, multi-stakeholder processes, defined as ‘interaction mechanism[s...] based on consensual decision-making processes that bring together a variety of stakeholders’ (Turcotte, 2000, p.128) including the private sector, governmental and non-governmental organisations, are central in environmental governance. Within global environmental regimes (e.g. the biodiversity convention, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the desertification convention) following the Rio Summit, they have become a key governance template for international donors engaged in sustainable development (Murphy & Coleman, 2000). In the last two decades multi-stakeholder processes have proliferated also at the national and local level. Many are linked to donor-led initiatives, whilst others emerged from civil society campaigns (Murphy & Coleman, 2000). These forums can expand political access for social movements in two ways. First, given that they represent additional venues, they increase the opportunities for contact with like-minded state actors. And second, at the core of multi-stakeholder communication processes are principles of democratic deliberation, participation, equity and justice (Hemmati, 2002). Clearly, these ground rules of engagement should favour traditionally weaker actors such as EMOs compared to traditional top-down governance processes (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009).

Given these potential advantages, EMOs are expected to seek out participation in multi-stakeholder processes. Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) argue that there is a
curvilinear relation between political opportunities and specific venues. EMOs are expected to be most interested in participating in those arenas that are neither completely favourable nor strongly resistant to their goals. Participation is therefore also a function of past experiences and perceived current and future access to elites that participate in these forums.

In the developing world many such processes have been both initiated and are still supported by major international donors (Hemmati, 2002; Truex & Søreide, 2011). Multi-stakeholder forums are therefore also a vehicle of influence for international actors. Yet, the effectiveness of these forums depends on whether national actors appropriate these processes.

**Methods**

This paper operationalises the interactionist approach to political opportunities suggested by Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) through the analysis of inter-organizational networking. This means studying how EMOs and state agencies are linked and interact. I first identified the EMOs that work on forest tenure in Indonesia. This involved a two-step procedure: the first step relates to the researcher’s knowledge based on review of literature, documents of EMOs, media coverage, and validation through key informants (nominalist approach); the second step refers to the perception of the actors themselves (realist approach) (Laumann and Knoke 1987, Saunders 2007). In the survey, respondents were asked whether their organisation was part of the environmental movement and whether it was involved in forest tenure activism at the national level. Any negative response led to the exclusion of the EMOs from
the study (Di Gregorio, 2012). This procedure led to the identification of 25 core EMOs active in the policy domain. Representatives of these EMOs participated in a quantitative survey on networking and in semi-structured interviews. The data for the study were collected between 2006 and 2007 in the Indonesian capital Jakarta. In addition, part of the qualitative analysis on multi-stakeholder forums is based on secondary literature.

Three survey questions, one identifying key state actors, and the other two on transactional activism (lobbying and participation in new modes of governance) provide the data used to construct and analyse inter-organizational networking.

The questions are:

1. Which are the government agencies active in shaping forest policies (in terms of both environmental and land use issues)?

This question identifies the perceived influence, according to EMOs, of state actors in the forest policy domain. Responses are used to assess influence of state actors which is then compared to lobbying interactions.

The second question identifies lobbying interactions, and the third participation in forums (including new modes of governance):

2. Does your organization lobby government agencies to affect policies? (Yes/No).

If the response is ‘yes’:

2.a. Indicate the government agencies that your organization has lobbied in the last 12 months.

3. Has your organization participated in forums to interact with national level state policy actors (working groups, commissions etc.)? (Yes/No)

If the response is ‘yes’:
3.a. Indicate those in which your organization has participated in the last 12 months.

The replies from 2.a. and 3.a. provide the relational data to construct two inter-organizational networks, one on lobbying activities (Figure 1) and one on participation in forums with state actors (Figure 2). Both are two-mode networks, where EMOs represent one set of actors (first mode vertices) and state actors and forums respectively represent the second set of actors (second mode vertices) (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The direction of ties goes only from EMOs to state actors and from EMOs to forums. Consequently, the data reflect how EMOs describe their lobbying interactions with state actors and their participation in forums.

I use exploratory social network analysis (Nooy de, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2005; Scott, 2000), and more specifically measures of centrality to assess influence of state actors, identify state actors that are major targets of lobbying and the venues in which EMOs participate the most. Centrality is one of the most widely used concepts in social network analysis, and many different measures exist (Borgatti & Everett, 2006). Centrality measures identify ‘important’ or ‘prominent’ actors (vertices) in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p.169). I use the eigenvector centrality measure to identify influential state actors and those that are main targets of lobbying. Eigenvector centrality refers to the sum of ties of an actor (number of nominations of influence and lobbying ties respectively) weighted by the centralities of actors to which the actor is tied (Bonacich, 1987). For the network related to influence (question 1) we can attribute a status of ‘authority’ to state agencies with high eigenvector centrality. For the lobbying network, high eigenvector centrality refers to being a preferred target of lobbying. To measure the importance of forums or venues
I use a slightly different measure called ‘authority’ developed by Kleinberg (1999) and adapted by Zaveršnik et al. (2002) for two-mode networks. The measure associates two weights with each vertex according to the direction of the ties: an authority weight (referring to incoming ties) and a hub weight (referring to outgoing ties). The underlying logic for assigning weights is: ‘If a vertex [representing an EMO] points to many vertices with large authority weight, it should receive a large hub weight. If a vertex [representing a venue] is pointed to by many vertices with large hub weights, then it should receive a large authority weight’ (Zaveršnik, et al., 2002: 114). In two-mode networks a set of vertices can be associated only with one weight: first-mode vertices can only be hubs (they only have outgoing ties), while second-mode vertices can only be authorities (they have only incoming ties). The calculations of the social network analysis measures are done with Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, , n.d.) and UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 1999). In the figures, centrality measures are visualized through the size of the vertices. The next sections present the results of the empirical analysis.

**Forest Activism and Lobbying in Indonesia**

In Indonesia, EMOs use multiple repertoires of collective action, which poses both advantages and risks (Mosley, 2011; van der Heijden, 1997). EMOs in the forest tenure domain engage in mobilization for public protest (Di Gregorio, 2011; Nomura, 2009; Peluso, et al., 2008) as well as in forms of transactional activism like lobbying to seek access to the state. While 88% of EMOs participate in protest activities, finding elite allies and nurturing alliance systems is also a crucial activity. In fact, in this policy domain 92% of EMOs engage in lobbying (Di Gregorio, 2012).
If political access to state actors were the same for all EMOs, lobbying would be directed to the most influential state agencies. After all, it is wasteful to divert resources to lobbying less influential ones. In contrast, a deviation towards other actors can reveal lack of access to key state actors. When influential state actors resist engaging with certain EMOs, these are better off seeking other potential allies by lobbying less influential but more receptive actors (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). To assess if EMOs target the most influential state agencies, I compare lobbying targets with levels of perceived influence of state actors.

While EMOs indicated a total number of twelve state agencies shaping forest policies in Indonesia, they lobbied as many as 25 state agencies over the twelve months preceding the survey (Figure 1). The Ministry of Forestry and the People’s Representative Council (the main Indonesian national legislature) are the most sought-after targets for lobbying, followed by the Ministry of Environment and the National Land Planning Agency. While these are all important state agencies in this domain, a closer comparison between influence and lobbying reveals important differences.

The Ministry of Forestry is both the most influential actor in the policy domain (with a percentage of eigenvector centrality of 89.5) and the main target of lobbying activities (percentage of eigenvector centrality 63.3). This is as expected given that it is the main bureaucratic agency mandated to manage state forestlands. But to assess the degree of openness of political opportunities, the relevant measure is the difference between these scores. Five state actors have a negative difference score and five other actors have a positive one (Table 1). This means that lobbying efforts do not strictly follow influence levels. There clearly is a diversion of lobbying from the
three most influential actors, foremost the Ministry of Forestry, but also the National Development Planning Agency and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, towards less influential ones. Conversely, the most striking positive difference pertains to the People’s Representative Council, followed at a distance by the Ministry of Environment.
Note: The size of vertices reflects eigenvector centrality scores. All networks analysed are directed networks and the direction of ties goes from EMOs to state actors. In the figures the direction of the ties is not displayed to improve readability.
I argue that the discrepancy between influence and lobbying scores reveals different political opportunities to access specific state actors. Elite actors with positive percentage change scores are more open towards EMOs demands, while those with negative scores prevent access. To validate this, next I look at whose interests are threatened or supported by the main demands of EMOs in this domain.

Table 1. State actors with highest positive and negative differences between lobbying and influence centrality scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lobbying (a)</th>
<th>Influence (b)</th>
<th>Difference between lobbying and influence eigenvector centrality (a-b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Eigenvector centrality</td>
<td>% Eigenvector centrality</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher influence than lobbying scores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Forestry</td>
<td>63.30</td>
<td>89.50</td>
<td>-26.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Development Planning Agency</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>-7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Energy &amp; Mineral Resources</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>17.40</td>
<td>-6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>12.99</td>
<td>15.90</td>
<td>-2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local governments</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>-1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher lobbying than influence scores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Representative Council (DPR)</td>
<td>55.00</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>45.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Environment</td>
<td>33.80</td>
<td>23.80</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Services</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry &amp; Trade</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Land Agency</td>
<td>22.20</td>
<td>21.70</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main advocacy efforts are framed around the need for both increased recognition of locally exercised rights to forest resources and improved forest management (Di Gregorio, 2012; Stoler, 1986).

Which state interests are most threatened by these frames? The call for strengthening local rights clashes most directly with key interests within the Ministry of Forestry, which has
the mandate to manage (and de facto controls) all state forestlands in Indonesia (McCarthy, 2000; Peluso, 1992). State forestlands are a vast resource covering a total area of 133 million hectares (World Bank, 2006). The most powerful unit within the Ministry of Forestry is the Directorate for Forest Utilization. It controls the revenue flow from logging concessions and other forest fees and contributes roughly 1% of the total revenue of the Indonesian Government. Its main priority is to advance large-scale forest exploitation for national development aims, and while sustainability standards exist, they are only weakly enforced (Rametsteiner & Simula, 2003). Consequently, the demand of EMOs for greater recognition of rights of local users to forest resources represents a major threat to the Ministry’s control over state forestlands. Because of this, opportunities to discuss and influence the Ministry are very limited. Under such conditions, it is probably better to seek out other elite allies. This explains the much lower levels of lobbying directed to the Ministry of Forestry (-26%) compared to the influence attributed to it.

The second biggest negative difference pertains to the National Development Planning Agency. This agency and its local branches coordinate land use decisions (McCarthy, 2004), which should take into account local rights to resources. While the formal procedures for the development of land use plans are formulated as a bottom-up exercise – thereby in theory respecting local rights to resources – in practice the process is reversed. In addition, the agency’s role is often relegated to negotiating disagreements between different bureaucratic agencies, as opposed to ensuring that local demands for access to forests are taken into account (Contreras-Hermosilla & Fay, 2005). It is not surprising then, that environmental justice organizations find the National Development Planning Agency not very open to their claims.

Finally, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources has a strong interest in mining activities in forest areas. The vast expanses of state forestlands contain very valuable
minerals, which the Ministry is eager to exploit. The concerns of environmentalists relate primarily to the polluting and degrading consequences of commercial mineral exploitation, but also to the risk of dispossession of local people that mining can entail. One recent national level dispute was related to the issue of mining in protected areas. In this case, the Ministry of Forestry took sides with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources in defending existing mining concessions against the alliance of the environmental movement with the Ministry of the Environment (Simamora, 2011; Witular, 2008).

More generally, there is a clash of worldviews and respective frames between EMOs and these three state actors on two levels. First, because environmental justice organizations act as the defenders of local forest communities, whom they believe can manage forests more sustainably than the state. This clashes with the attitude of part of the state bureaucracy, which adopts a paternalistic view of the state as the protector of nature threatened by peasants who destroy the forest with their unsustainable farming techniques (Forsyth & Walker, 2008; Peluso, 1992). Second, the worldview of EMOs that places a high value on environmental sustainability clashes with the dominant development paradigm in Indonesia that is based on accelerated growth through large-scale exploitation of natural resources (Dove & Kammen, 2001; Peluso, 1992).

In terms of difference between lobbying and influence scores, the Ministry of the Environment has a highest positive difference. This reflects a historical alliance system of the Ministry with the environmental movement (Peluso, et al., 2008). This alliance is important to both parties. For the underfunded state ministry that has an exclusively coordinating role, it is a way to strengthen and legitimize its position vis-à-vis more powerful ministries. For EMOs, the ministry represents a key ally that can fight for many of their causes from within the palaces of power. Clearly, there is also a risk for EMOs in such alliances, as state actors might try to co-opt EMOs (Peluso, et al., 2008; van der Heijden, 1997). The second highest
difference between lobbying and influence scores pertains to the People’s Representative Council. This reflects both broad and contingent political opportunities. First, since 2006 a legal provision allows non-state actors to provide evidence at hearings in the legislative commissions, and EMOs have been quick to take advantage of this opportunity. Second, it is easier to recruit allies among the vast variety of elected representatives from different parties and factions than it is to recruit them among civil servants, whose function and decision-making power is more restricted by their institutional mandate (personal communication, Ivan Ageung, 2006). The high levels of lobbying in the legislative branch of government reflect its general openness to civil society, as well as specific alliances with supportive political representatives on specific campaign issues.

Thus, in all major cases, lobbying patterns can be explained according to the level of threat posed by the claims of EMOs to single state agencies. This supports evidence from existing literature that political opportunities are open to those claims that are in line with the interests of specific elite actors and are closed to those that threaten them (D. S. Meyer, 2004; Rootes, 1999b; Saunders, 2009; Tarrow, 1996). I derive the following proposition from the above evidence:

Proposition 1:
When the most influential elites in a policy domain close access to EMO claims, EMOs direct lobbying efforts toward less influential but more receptive state actors in order to strengthen their alliance system.

Venues and Multi-Stakeholder Forums

Having assessed that political opportunities vary according to different state actors and the specific demands of EMOs, the next question is: Which are the venues that facilitate EMOs’
access to the state? And which actors facilitate such interactions? To answer these questions, I investigate the second network which depicts the participation of EMOs in such venues.

Figure 2 displays EMOs’ participation in forums during the twelve months preceding the survey. In the graph, EMOs are represented by triangles, and venues by circles. The ties broadly stand for the relation ‘participates in …’, in the same way as other affiliation networks are used to represent membership in clubs for example.

Sixty-four per cent of EMOs (16 out of 25) interacted in venues with state actors. But what types of venues are these? I have classified venues into conventional and new modes of governance. By conventional, I mean formal institutionalized policy channels (e.g. providing expert opinions to parliamentary commissions) and consultations with specific state agencies (generally initiated by state agencies to tap into EMO expertise, e.g. invitations by the Ministry of Forestry or participation in discussion on Multilateral Environmental Agreements). New modes of governance in the forest tenure domain in Indonesia are represented here by multi-stakeholder forums such as the Indonesian Communication Forum on Community Forestry, independent commissions such as the National Forestry Board and self-regulation bodies such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (see Figure 2 for full list).

Out of the 25 venues, 15 can be classified as conventional venues and eight as new modes of governance, while two do not fall into either category. New modes of governance expand opportunities to access state actors in a number of ways. They increase the number of venues accessible to EMOs by 50 per cent, compared with conventional venues alone. The increase in opportunities to meet state actors is not just valuable per se, it expands the portfolio of strategies and tactics that can be used for advocacy. It allows, for example, EMOs to shift focus and venue as windows of opportunities open or close. In addition, they tend to involve venues that bring together a large number of actors compared to one-on-one
consultations. As a result, they allow for more interaction – including interaction among
EMOs – and if EMOs are able to support each other and act as a coalition they have greater
chances of success. I derive the following proposition from the evidence:

Proposition 2:

By increasing the number of institutional venues for transactional activism, new
modes of governance expand political opportunities for EMOs. They facilitate the
building of alliance systems both with elites and among EMOs, and enable shifts in
strategies and targets.

How can we identify the venues that provide better political opportunities for EMOs? I start
by assessing the importance of venues using the centrality measure of ‘authority’. The
participation of an EMO in a venue reflects a positive judgment about the potential to impact
policy decision-makers, and therefore the perception that political opportunities are not
completely foreclosed. Given that the relationship between participation in venues and
political opportunities is curvilinear (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996), it is more fruitful to
access venues that are neither completely closed nor completely open to EMOs’ claims.
Consequently, high authority weights should reflect the potential for a window of opportunity
offered by a specific forum.
Figure 2. Authorities and hubs of the venue network

Note: The figure displays only the main component (the biggest connected sub-network) of the venue network. Size of vertices reflects authority weight for venues and hub weight for EMOs. EMOs that do not participate in these venues are not included in the figure.
The size of the venue vertices in Figure 2 reflects authority weights: the bigger the vertices, the higher the authority weight. Among the venues with highest authority weights there are four (out of the five) multi-stakeholder forums. Why are multi-stakeholder forums so important? There are two plausible explanations. On the one hand, multi-stakeholder forums are particularly attractive to EMOs because of the inclusive communication principles that characterize them. These principles provide a more levelled playing field for EMOs vis-à-vis other actors. On the other hand, it could also be the case that political opportunities through conventional channels are extremely limited, which would make multi-stakeholder forums only relatively more attractive, or EMOs participate even if they provide few openings. Yet, the latter is unlikely, because in the long run it should lead EMOs to avoid such venues (D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996).

The importance of a venue is unlikely to coincide with the level of impact it has for EMOs. In fact, there is substantial literature questioning their overall effectiveness (Truex & Søreide, 2010). But the fact that they are the most sought-after venues, and are central to the network, means that they do provide important political opportunities at least in relative terms. I derive the following proposition from the evidence:

Proposition 3:

In the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia, multi-stakeholder forums provide an important window of opportunity for EMOs to access state actors.

Next, I take a look at the four venues with the highest authority scores and investigate possible international links. The highest score pertains to the Indonesian Communication Forum on Community Forestry (FKKM). It was set up in 1997 with the support of the Ford Foundation as a multi-stakeholder forum to facilitate dialogue on community forestry. It was
particularly active in the revision of the New Forestry Law in 1999 and it focuses in particular on the resolution of conflicts over forestland.

The second venue is the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan (FLEGT) funded by the European Commission and aimed at improving forest governance in Indonesia, particularly in relation to illegal logging, through a bilateral treaty called the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA). A requirement of VPAs is for negotiations to occur through multi-stakeholder processes.

The third is the Indonesian Working Group on Forest Finance (IWFF), an independent venue first set up by the Centre for International Forestry Research. It aims to increase the transparency of economic and financial decision-making in the forestry sector, is open to all types of organizations and individual actors that share its concerns, and operates on multi-stakeholder principles.

And finally, there is the Working Group on Forest Land Tenure, a multi-stakeholder forum particularly active in land conflict resolution. It was established in 2000 as part of the commitment of the Government of Indonesia to the Consultative Group for Indonesia, which includes all major international development donors and is funded by international sources. At the time of the survey, it was hosted by the Ministry of Forestry and chaired by the Head of the Ministry’s Research Unit on Social and Economic Policies.

Thus, all most sought-after venues that provide political opportunities for EMOs were set up with the support of international donors. They have introduced the principles underlying multi-stakeholder processes and continue to support their work. The importance of these venues in the forest tenure domain today is however also dependent on the strong commitment from national actors to appropriate these new modes of governance. While without the commitment of national actors these forums would likely remain empty shells, international funding provides most resources for their activities.
Proposition 4:

International organizations are indispensable to sustaining key multi-stakeholder forums in the forest tenure policy domain. Their support is necessary but not sufficient to promote the access of EMOs to the state through these forums.

Conclusion

This paper adopts an interactionist approach to political opportunities to investigate the complexity of how EMOs try to gain access to the state. While broad characteristics of the political context affect the emergence of social movements and the form they take, at the meso-level proximate political opportunities differ for specific actors and are contingent on their interests, claims and frames (Rootes, 1999b; Tarrow, 1996). While some state actors perceive specific challenges as a threat, others consider them opportunities to seek out allies. Only by analysing meso-level processes is it possible to delineate the trajectories of differential access to the polity. This calls for the use of definitions of social movements and of the state that are pluralistic and recognize that each is formed by a variety of actors with diverse interests, values and strategies.

This paper makes two key contributions. First, it shows that in a context of contingent political opportunities EMOs act strategically and try to influence state actors that are most receptive to their claims. Second, it provides evidence that new modes of governance increase the opportunities for EMOs to access the state. Lobbying patterns indicate that when political opportunities are limited EMOs divert lobbying from the most influential state agencies to less influential but more responsive ones in an attempt to strengthen their alliance system. The investigation of the type of venues that EMOs seek out to interact with state
actors shows that new modes of governance are most sought after forums and that they expand the number of opportunities EMOs have to access state actors. Behind these new venues are worldviews that have developed in the international arena and are linked to the rise of the sustainable development paradigm. The influence of international organizations on these forums is still visible today, although their effectiveness depends more and more on domestic political relations.

This paper has raised some important questions about the features of proximate political opportunities and their constructionist nature. Within broader social and political constraints, EMOs have at least some ability to manage their access to the state, in the same way as state actors use their resources to facilitate or prevent access.

References


